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By contrasting the optimal with the actual location of Spain’s main
production centre in Bilbao, we have tried to resolve the enigma that
mislocation introduced an important welfare loss in Spain’s
industrialisation. This analysis considers the optimal location for integrated
steel mills in Spain from their origins (s) until the Spanish Civil War
(–). The first part of this article introduces the relevant aspects for
formalising a model, while Section  applies the methodology. The
numerical results show how the major technical change – the reduction of
coal consumption – affected each of the alternative sites. They also allow
us to identify ‘the overall optimum site’, which was not Bilbao. Our final
conclusions confirm that the actual centre of iron and steel production
during the period considered was a second-best location. The cost in
terms of direct welfare loss, in terms of captive markets and rent-seeking
used to maintain this second-best solution, and the ultimate consequences
of mislocation, point to an inefficiency which has changed the course of
modern Spanish industrialisation.
Introduction
The age of mass steel production began between  and the early s with
the diffusion of the Bessemer steel process. As both the Bessemer method and
its immediate successor – the Siemens acid open hearth – could only use low-
phosphorus iron ore, the limited supply of such ore in Western Europe during
the steel and railway booms sent investors off into the European periphery in
search of low phosphorus iron ore mines. This supply constraint was to be
overcome in the latter decades of the nineteenth century by two parallel devel-
opments. The Martin-Siemens process introduced a new production method,
which recycled iron scrap. The Thomas process and the application of its
principles to the Siemens open hearth furnace allowed other ores – with high
and medium phosphorus content – to be processed into steel.
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 Abstracting from other ore qualities, we can maintain that iron ores with a phosphorus
content below . per cent were appropriate for Bessemer and acid Siemens openThese four mass steel processes were introduced with different intensities
in the leading European steel producing nations. In Germany, basic tech-
nologies, which used medium and high phosphorus content ores, became
dominant after the mid s. Great Britain remained tied to acid tech-
nologies – which required low-phosphorus ores – well into the twentieth
century. National supply constraints on available home ores and falling
transport costs allowed Lorraine and Sweden to become major phosphoric
ore suppliers to the emerging industry in Germany, and introduced Spain
to the British markets where it supplied nearly  per cent of all imported
ore between  and .
The important amount of non-metallic debris –  to  per cent –
which was transported in the form of ore to steel centres in Western
Europe, the almost unlimited access to charcoal in Sweden and the abun-
dant coal deposits in Spain, raise the question of why these peripheral ores
were not processed directly in their countries of origin and sold as higher
value added products. As Spanish contemporary Pablo de Alzola put it in
:
With two tons of mineral worth  pesetas, one ton of pig iron worth 
pesetas is produced; if this is transformed into rails then the value is
enhanced to  pesetas; [rolling it into plates it reaches a price of 
pesetas] with the evident result that if we export the greater part of our
minerals for the infinitesimal price of  pesetas, we imitate Esau in selling
his birthright for a mess of pottage.
The Basque iron and steel industry, centred around Bilbao, grew at a sub-
stantial rate during the period we are examining. The three modern mills
which were erected there in the s and s used ‘state of the art’ tech-
nology which they obtained through their ore export ties with Wales and the
north-east coast of England. But the industry grew at a much lower rate
than its European counterparts and had established a dominant firm oli-
gopoly by the turn of the century – much earlier than similar concentration
movements in other countries. What draws attention to the Spanish case is
not the existence of cartels and pressure groups, but the intensity and speed
with which they eliminated competition. This has been explained by the
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hearth processing, those between . and  per cent for basic open hearth, and for
those between  and  per cent Thomas processing was applied. Higher
concentrations of phosphorus damaged linings seriously and were lowered by mixing
with ores with a lower concentration (Temin , p.   and Rodriguez Alonso
).
 Flinn (, p. , n). Over  per cent of all ore smelted in Great Britain between
 and  came from Spain. Advisory Council Department of Scientific and
Industrial Research (), Report on the Sources and Production of Iron and other
Metalliferous Ores used in the Iron and Steel Industry. London.
 Sánchez Ramos (, p. ). Translation taken from Flinn (, p. ).proneness of Spain’s institutional framework to generate this kind of econ-
omic interventionism.
State and steel – heavy industry – are two of the basic foundations for
Alexander Gerschenkron’s theories of development in backward countries.
Everything points to Spain as a likely candidate in which to find
Gerschenkron’s patterns of backward development: with strong state policy
to promote initially inefficient heavy industry.
Surprisingly, export figures before the early twentieth century protectionism
identify Spanish pig iron and raw steel products as competitive. Spanish pro-
ducers exported  per cent of the pig iron they produced between  and
,andpercentbetweenand.ThecostpriceofBilbaohematite
pigironremainedbelowthemarketpriceforCleveland#pigiron–thecheap-
est pig iron sold on world markets – well into the first two decades of the twen-
tiethcentury.RailcostpricesinSpainwerepercentlowerthanmarketprices
inGreatBritain,GermanyandtheUSAduringthesameperiod.Theliterature
states that mislocation and closing the economy to free trade was what stopped
Spain from developing a buoyant export-based steel industry in the long run.
Wrong location and protectionism are two issues which are easily separ-
ated and our analysis will concentrate on the former, the question of the
mislocation of integrated steel mills in Spain at the end of the nineteenth
century and during the first third of the twentieth century. Identifying the
correct location of Spain’s main production centre is aimed at resolving the
enigma that mislocation introduced inefficiencies and redundant costs, and
weakened the competitiveness of Spain’s potential products on inter-
national markets. At the same time this analysis will move in a dynamic con-
text and will attempt to assess whether the optimal site varied, as substitutes
for coal – one of the main factors of production – were found throughout
the period studied, and how this affected Spain’s steel industry.
The suspicion that Bilbao – the centre of Spanish steel production – was
not the ideal location has been commented on by a number of Spanish his-
torians and economists. Nadal () called it ‘a twist of logic’ which situ-
ated the centre of gravity of the Spanish iron and steel industry near Biscay’s
ore mines rather than on Asturian coal fields. Tortella (), given the
lack of coking coals and the strong competitiveness of its ores, situates
‘competitive Spanish iron and steel industry outside the country: in Cardiff,
Newcastle, Essen, or Pittsburgh and not in Bilbao, Avilés, Málaga or
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 Fraile (, pp. , , ,  and ).
 See Houpt () for a detailed discussion of the competitiveness of Spanish iron and
steel products.
 Fraile (, pp. –), Sanchez Ramos (, p. ).
 The loss of competitiveness due to protection will be addressed in a separate analysis.
See Houpt ().
 Nadal (, p. ).
 Tortella (, p. ).Sagunto’. Tamames () refers to the choice of Biscay as ‘a site that did
not prove rational in the long run, [but that] followed a certain logic in its
origins.’
Elsewhere, location analyses have been applied to the iron and steel
industry: Isard (), Isard and Capron () and Hekman () for the
United States or Altman () for Canada. These studies have focused on
explaining shifts in the location of the industry, the criteria these shifts have
been determined by or the rivalry between different steel producing regions.
The existence of the steel industry’s mislocation has not been examined, nor
have the criteria affecting the particular case of Spain been formally exposed.
With this proposal in mind, the first part of this article will introduce a
general model for locating integrated steel and include some specific con-
siderations for the case of Spain. The integrated plant will be considered our
unit of analysis due to the externalities and positive economies to which it
is susceptible. Section  will show the methodology applied, that is, the
underlying assumptions, the model of transport cost minimisation and the
calibration of parameters. The numerical results presented in the following
section are the result of combining the two alternative sources of coal with
the different feasible iron ore sources. At the same time these tables will
show how the reduction of coal consumption – the predominant technical
change in this period – affected each of these alternative combinations of
inputs. The results will also allow us to identify ‘the overall optimum site’,
given the trend to reducing the weight of coal as an input.
The preliminary results will be scrutinised by introducing different
aspects originally excluded from the model. Uniform transport costs will
be questioned. The alternative of sea transport will be contemplated.
Scope economies, such as port capacities, ore transportation facilities,
labour and capital availability will be considered to discuss the results
obtained. Our final conclusions will show that Bilbao – the actual centre of
Spanish iron and steel production up to the late s – was a second-best
location.
The relevance of these results is important. A correct location of the steel
industry would have changed the course of Spain’s industrial development.
With the installation of the steel industry on a major coal site, heavy
industry would have agglomerated near coal deposits, iron and steel could
have been provided at a much lower price, and the material cost of indus-
trialising and providing cheap energy would have been reduced. Given the
importance that backward countries designate to iron and steel as a strategic
sector for industrial development, the ultimate consequences of mislocation
are even more devastating. The DUP activities, rent-seeking and cartelisa-
tion which maintained mislocation in Bilbao would not have characterised
the industry to the same extent as they in fact did. Industrial growth, in gen-
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 Tamames (, p. ).eral, could have been far more extensive, both in volume and geographical
spread and Spanish industrial development would have taken a completely
different course.
Location theory
Walter Isard’s selected papers include a thorough discussion of Alfred Weber’s
() model of industrial location based on transport cost, fixed technical
coefficients, and cost minimisation. Weber’s model provides the ideal frame-
work for determining the optimal location of high volume, input-reducing
industries with a low degree of permissible factor substitution, as is the case of
the steel industry. In the rest of this section we will motivate, define and cali-
brate the application of the Weberian model to our problem of location. To
begin with, and following Isard’s patterns of location in the iron and steel
industry since the early nineteenth century, we can identify four predominant
and determining factors: the location of coal, iron ore, markets and scrap.
The supply of raw materials in high volume transformation industries,
such as iron and steel processing, is a vital factor affecting site selection
given the incidence of transport cost on total costs. But producers do not
only apply a rationale related to acquiring resources. Especially with the
progress of communications, they need to counterbalance these forces of
attraction with those related to the proximity of their markets. The mobility
of factors and processing technology reduces the exercise of cost minimisa-
tion to choosing the minimum transport cost site. We can assume that a
specific plant using a fixed set of inputs and distributing its products to
known markets can be set up in any location.
Besides the procurement costs of high volume inputs and the distribution
of final products discussed above, optimal location must also consider direct
labour costs, overhead costs such as interest payments, rents, royalties,
maintenance and depreciation, taxes and other conventional expenditures.
For the iron and steel industry, these additional factors combine to form a
very low percentage of the final cost, and their price differentials between
one region and another usually lack the magnitude to make them relevant
in determining the cost-minimising optimal site. Only when total transport
costs vary little between alternative locations will these other processing
costs become the key elements in location.
In the case of iron and steel transformation we can define an optimal site
as the geographical co-ordinates which, given a vector of prices and decision
variables, minimise costs for a firm. The iron and steel industry uses two
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 Isard (, pp. –).
 Isard ().
 See Lüth and König (, pp. –); Haven (, p. ); Isard (); Day and
Nelson (); Hekman ().
 These variables can be distance, supply delay times and factor quality variability.main material factors – raw iron and coal – and one minor material input –
flux. Given the ‘state of the art’ technology being used, we can assume that
all other production factors have very small price and quality differentials
from one region to another and need not be included as decision variables.
Raw iron can initially be assumed to be iron ore, although ore as the prime
source of iron and steel was increasingly replaced by scrap iron after the end
of the nineteenth century. This meant that works reduced the proportion of
their steel obtained from smelting ore to pig iron and then processing it to
steel. Steel was increasingly obtained by refining scrap in open hearth fur-
naces. In the United States, by  less than  per cent of semi-finished
iron and steel was obtained from smelted pig iron. As the autochthonous
supply of scrap iron was generally scarce in industrially backward countries
– they had less to scrap – and the increasing world demand for scrap drove
prices higher, in the ‘late follower’ countries scrap had a lower presence in
open hearths compared to pig iron. For the Spanish factories analysed,
open hearth steel production was very secondary to Bessemer processing.
Similarly to the Dowlais Iron Co., these plants installed open hearth fur-
naces only to meet naval contract specifications and fed them with their own
Bessemer scrap. Scrap was not a viable raw iron substitute for these fac-
tories.
For the purposes of our analysis, this narrows the important factors down
to three – coal, flux and iron ore. Given that for the type of ore to be
processed in Spain, flux is mainly limestone, which is a very commonly
found material, we can concentrate the exercise on coal and iron ore. A
number of relevant mines can be considered for both raw materials in
Spain. The exact criteria for their selection are exposed in the calibration of
the parameters in the discussion of the model.
The alternative supply of ores or coal from outside Spanish territory is not
considered in this exercise. The case of British coking coal is especially rel-
evant. There are numerous reasons for excluding this possibility. Spain
imposed increasingly nationalist economic policies and, by the end of the
period examined, Spain emerged into complete economic autarchy for
almost twenty years. At the same time, the coal price hikes from the s
on, supply cuts during the two world wars, and post-war restrictions, forced
Spanish producers to switch to Spanish coke in the long run. Mixing tech-
niques and chemical knowledge made this increasingly feasible.
Even though the added weight of coal and ore consumed worldwide
totalled more than three tons per ton of final steel product up to the middle
of the twentieth century, we can observe that iron and steel plants have not
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 Isard (, p. ) and Burn (, pp. –).
 In a period as late as  to , Spain obtained two thirds of its scrap for steel
transformation from imports. In the s the market price for scrap was still  per
cent higher per ton than pig iron produced in Bilbao. Merello Llasera (, p. ).always been located strictly by the criterion of proximity to either or both
resources.
One general trend in the leading iron and steel companies could be the
key to understanding sites which were not situated on coalfields. The
amount of coal being employed to produce a ton of pig iron was gradually
and persistently reduced. Iron ore input remained fairly constant, oscillat-
ing between . and  tons, depending on its metallic content. But coal
input was steadily reduced from  to  tons in the s to an average of
. or . in  for Great Britain and the United States respectively.
This reduction was due to the introduction of hot-blast techniques, the
improved homogeneity standards of the coal used, and other improvements
in the furnaces’ practices. By the middle of the s most of these coal sav-
ings in pig iron production had been attained in the modern mills set up in
Biscay. They used an average . tons of coal.
Therefore we will limit ourselves to analysing energy savings obtained 
in other areas of production. Integration of coking, blast furnaces, steel 
The location of Spanish integrated steel, – 
 Yields for pig iron are usually expressed in coke per pig iron but the conversion to coal
is fairly easy. For Great Britain and the US the average coke yield per ton of coal ranged
between  and  per cent. Isard (, p. ) quoting US Bureau of Mines, Mineral
Yearbook, annual issues and Burnham and Hoskins (, Appendix III, pp. –).
Table . Geographical examples of oriented location.
Orientation Location





Iron ore Lorraine, France
Duleth, Great Lakes, US
Bilbao, Spain
Cleveland, GB
Limestone Volta Works, Brazil
Coal and ore Birmingham, Alabama, US
Teeside, GB
Transhipment points Cleveland, Ohio, US
Buffalo, Indiana, US
Gary, Indiana, US
Coastal or waterside Sparrows Point, Baltimore, US
Stettin, Germany 
Sagunto, Spain
Market Ford Steel Plant, Detroit, USprocessing and rolling, provided heat economies because downstream pro-
cesses used upstream waste gases for heat and motive energy. Both coke
oven and blast furnace waste gases were used to generate the energy needed
for blasting machinery, for providing motion and heating to the rolling mills
and for transportation of materials and products. A similar set of energy-
saving economies became available as liquid iron was directly converted
into steel, or when fresh steel, which had soaked out heat evenly in a pit,
was immediately rolled into its intermediate and final shape, hardly needing
to be reheated. In the latter cases substantial reheating costs were avoided.
Even greater savings in coal consumption were introduced with the gas-
driven electrification of motors in the s. These considerations applied
to the leading steel technologies at that time, namely Bessemer, Siemens,
Siemens-Martin and Thomas. Those heat economies which can be attrib-
uted to vertical integration in iron and steel processing also justify the inte-
grated steel plant as the organisational unit of analysis to be considered.
Nonetheless, coal reduction was a very gradual, input-specific process. As
late as , ENSIDESA – the public owned steelmill in Asturias on the
north-west coast of Spain – calculated a minimum of . tons of coal for
processing iron ore to a ton of pig iron. An additional –. tons would have
been needed to process the necessary amount of pig iron into structural
steel, using coal as caloric input. The real total amounts to consider are
significantly lower. Theoretically, waste gas production in coking and pig
iron processing would fully cover the heat requirements without using any
additional coal in the later stages of transformation. Even though waste
gases were being used as a source of heat and motive power in Spanish
plants before the Spanish Civil War, we cannot consider coal as being fully
replaceable in the processing of iron into steel and steel into its final rolled
form. A reasonable ‘guesstimate’ for the total amount of coal employed in
rolled steel products would be between . and  tons of coal per ton of fin-
ished product. An amount between . and  tons, however, would be
much more reasonable for the period under study. The amounts for iron ore
needed would lie between . and . tons, depending on the iron content
of the ores – see Table  below.
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 See INI Ensidesa – Proyecto de la Fábrica de Avilés, June . The technical coefficients
take the input quality differences into account by calibrating a mill production function,
which is equally applicable to any of the technologies being used to process them. The
minimum coal weight reflects the maximum amount of coal chemically necessary for
reducing the lowest quality of these five ores to pig iron, and the maximum coal weight
reflects the highest minimum amount of coal necessary for the complete process of
transformation from ore to structural steel for the highest coal consuming combination –
León ores and basic Siemens. The declining discrete amounts we assume between these
amounts reflect the gradual replacement of coal in all areas of transformation except pig
iron processing and the lower initial maximum amounts of coal that may be necessary for
any of the hematite ores processes with a different steel technology.Our model should therefore establish the correct location of an integrated
steel plant which combines the different cokeable coals in amounts between
. and  tons with any of the important ores, in order to produce and dis-
tribute final structural steel products at a minimum cost.
The model
The model we will formulate mathematically can be visualised abstractly as
taking a board with the shape of Spain’s map with holes for the different raw
material sites and consumption points. We can introduce different sets of
strings from the bottom of the board to a nodal point on the surface – one
string for coke, one for ore and one for each consumption point. The length
of each string is proportional to the transportation costs of the raw material
or final product to be transported. Each set of strings represents a specific
combination of raw materials with the final consumption points. We would
then tie weights proportional to the weight of raw materials or final product
transported from or to this specific point to each corresponding string. If we
drop all weights at the same time the nodal point or knot will then come to
rest at the cost-minimising site for that specific set of strings. This is the
basic idea behind the Weberian model we propose. Our exercise is based on
the assumptions included in Weber’s original model and others will be
added in order to make it applicable to this specific case.
The presence of economies of scale in iron and steel production justifies
the abstraction of production to one firm to some degree, but we can also
assume this single firm to be representative of the industry as a whole, if we
did not find a single firm of this size realistic in this context. The allocation
of consumption is a function of the regional distribution of population and
economic activity which we must assume subject to minor variations for the
moment. The model will propose the uniformity of transport which does
not truly reflect reality, but will be re-examined when discussing results.
And finally, the rigidity of input combinations in metallurgic processes fully
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 See Paelinck and Nijkamp (, p. ) for a summary.
Table . The weight of Spanish iron ore in steel products.
Ore (tons) needed for
Iron ores from Iron content %  ton of steel product
Bilbao – Castro Urdiales  .
Sierra Menera  .
Almería – Granada  .
Ponferrada, León  .
Riff, Morocco  .
Source: Apraiz (, pp. –).supports a Leontief-type definition of production. Formalising these ideas
using Weber’s original model we can formulate the following assumptions:
Assumption : We are looking at a single representative firm that produces
a known amount of product.
Assumption : We have predetermined the weighted loci of consumption
and the points of origin of raw material are known points in
space.
Assumption : Transportation costs are uniform along each transportation
vector.
Assumption : The production function is Leontief with fixed technical
coefficients.
Assumption : The consumption distribution is known and remains invari-
able to changes in the location of the production centre.
The generalisation of Weber’s original location triangle can be defined as
the following points Oi (xi, yi) the iron ore mines, Cl(xl, yl) the coalfields 
and Bk (xk, yk) which we have generalised for (k   , , ... J) multiple
consumption points. The combined ‘distance’–‘transport cost’–‘fixed
material weight’ pull of each of these points will co-determine the optimal
production site in terms of transport cost minimisation. Mathematically this
can be expressed as follows:
Total transportation cost T.
T    

i   
tidiaiq    
K
k    
tkdkqk (a)
   
J   I   K
j   
tjdjajq
for j   (, , …,I, I   , …, I   K)
and ∃  aj such that ajq   qk ∀ j > I and ∀ k
dj    (xj   x  )   (y  j   y)   ∀ j (b)
q    
K
k   
qk (c)
Variables: qk the amount of product distributed at consump-
tion point Bk.
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 Originally the model was taken from Launhardt (), but Kuhn and Kuenne (),
Cooper (), Nijkamp and Paelinck () and Paelinck and Nijkamp () have
used this methodology.q the total volume of product.
ri the raw materials at O and C, (i   , )
di the distance from the unknown production
location to the raw material sites.
dk the distance from the unknown production
location to the consumption centre Bk.
ai denotes the weight volume of raw material
required to produce one weight unit of final 
product.
ti is the unit transportation cost per ton kilometre
for raw material.
tj is the transportation cost per ton kilometre for 
finished products.
ai   q is the total requirement of input ri used to pro-
duce one unit of final product.
Ti   ti   di   ai   q is the total transportation cost of raw material ri.
Tk   tk   dk   qk is the total transportation cost of final products qk.
The optimal location will be found by minimising an unknown set of co-
ordinates with respect to the unknown location – see Appendix, First Order
Conditions. In order to define a transport cost minimum, the transport
cost function T should be convex. As T is the sum of distance functions dj,
it will be sufficient to show that dj is convex for all j, that is, if its Hessian
matrix is semi-definite positive – see Appendix, Second Order Conditions.
Convexity of the distance functions verifies when the eigenvalues of the
determinant are non-negative. Using the properties of quadratic
expressions:   H   I   (h    )   (h    )   h  h       (h  
h)       h   h   h  h, the  ’s will be non-negative if:
() the trace of the Hessian is positive, that is h   h   , and
() the determinant of the Hessian is non-negative, that is h  h
  h   h   .
These two conditions can be shown to be true and any local optimum of
T will be a unique global minimum of this transportation problem – see
Appendix: Minimisation. Based on this property, the first order conditions
provide a system of non-linear equations that require a solution algorithm,
which will generate a numerical solution for the optimum in a finite number
of stages.
The next step is the calibration of the parameters to be used in the model.
The iron ore mines and coalfields for the exercise have been determined by
their degree of past importance, the reserves available and the quality of
their minerals. Fernández-Miranda () identifies both the coalfields and
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 See Appendix A in Paelinck and Nijkamp ().iron ore mining districts using the previous criteria. We have chosen the
coalfields near Mieres in Asturias [N] and La Robla, León [N] – mainly
because of their sufficient coking suitability, but also due to their steam and
heat qualities, and their availability. We had indicated that the amount of
coal consumed for one ton of final steel product was an amount between .
and  tons per ton of final output – even though we said that a lower bound
of . would be more realistic. The model will consider locations for dis-
crete amounts of coal – between . and  tons – being employed per ton of
final steel product made.
The choice of the ore mining districts includes the mines around Bilbao
[NE], the Sierra Menera mines in Teruel and Guadalajara [E], the mines in
Almería and Granada [S], the mines near Ponferrada in León [NW]. As a
remote option, we have added the Riff mines in Morocco [S] given their
relative proximity and their Spanish protectorate status until . Whereas
the most important ore fields for hematite ores suited for acid processing
were located in Biscay [NE], Teruel [E], Almería [S] and the Riff mines in
Morocco [S]. León [N] ores had a slightly higher phosphorus content which
made them more appropriate for the basic Siemens open hearth. The
weight of the iron ores in the finished products has been determined with
much greater precision. As normal processing losses are compensated by a
small per centage of shop scrap added in steel processing, the various ores
have only been adapted to reflect their different iron contents. Table 
shows the minimum amount of each ore used to obtain one ton of pig iron.
A caveat must be added concerning some of the ores considered. Although
the ores from Almería/Granada and Teruel were hematite and appropriate
for acid steel processing, a high percentage of the ores screened from both
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 Fernández-Miranda Gutiérrez (, p. ) shows the major coal producing areas in
, the maximum amount produced in one year, their probable reserves and the coal
classes available. Fernández-Miranda Gutiérrez (, pp. –) shows regional iron ore
production between  and  by provinces. Apraiz Barreiro (, pp. –),
complements that with a description of the most important iron ores used at that date,
their chemical composition, annual production, and reserves.
 Merello Llasera (, pp.  and ), defines the mines around Mieres and La Robla
as the only coal mining districts capable of supplying coal for coking and steel
processing purposes. During absolute economic autarky after the Civil War these
remained the only two fields capable of providing metallurgic coke in Spain.
 Between . and . tons of coal are necessary to reduce them to one ton of coke.
Approximately . tons of coke were used to process ore to pig iron. Further processing
of pig iron to steel and steel to its final form used energy equivalent to . tons of good
quality coal. We assume that at least one ton of coal energy had been already replaced
by waste gas energy which gives us the upper bound, a four ton total consumption for
one ton of steel product. The lower bound assumes that gradually all coal consumption
with the exception of coking coal could be substituted for waste gas energy, leaving us
with a minimum requirement of . tons.
 Data on the iron content were taken from Apraiz Barreiro (, pp. –).these regions was too small in size for blast furnace processing until the early
s when they could be agglomerated by sintering or other methods of
concentration. Until then, they were mixed with other ores. Without con-
sidering these limitations, none of these sites is dominant under the assump-
tions of our models. But by including them in the contrast we have measured
their effect on optimal location once sintering techniques became available.
The major consumption points used in the exercise were projected from the
regional steel demand schedule provided by París Eguilaz () for . The
co-ordinates used in the algorithm concentrate the regional consumption fig-
uresintheregion’scapitals.Thisistheearliestregionalbreakdownofsteelcon-
sumption we have been able to find. The demand schedule is probably biased
by over a decade of economic autarky and below the maximum production of
steel – one million tons – obtained in , but it is indicative of the average
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Table . Breakdown of Spanish steel product demand in  by
provinces.
Provinces Per cent Tons Provinces Per cent Tons
. Biscay . , . Orense . ,
. Barcelona . , . Palma . ,
. Madrid . , . Logroño . ,
. Guipuzcoa . , . Almería . ,
. Foreign Sales . , . Jaén . 
. Oviedo . , . Castellón . 
. Valencia . , . Teruel . 
. Seville . , . Badajoz . 
. La Coruña . , . Huesca . 
. Saragossa . , . Palencia . 
. Valladolid . , . Lugo . 
. Santander . , . Tenerife . 
. Cádiz . , . Toledo . 
. Málaga . , . Guadalajara . 
. Murcia . , . Gran Canaria . 
. Pontevedra . , . Cáceres . 
. León . , . Granada . 
. Navarra . , . Gerona . 
. Burgos . , . Segovia . 
. Ciudad Real . , . Albacete . 
. Alava . , . Cuenca . 
. Alicante . , . Soria . 
. Tarragona . , . Avila . 
. Córdoba . , . Morocco . 
. Lérida . , . Guinea . 
. Huelva . ,
. Salamanca . , TOTAL . ,
. Zamora . ,
Source: París Eguilaz (, p. ). Barreiro Zabala () shows steel products around that level between  and 
and later in /. This figure has been chosen arbitrarily but within the capacity of the
production centres.
consumption patterns for steel products in industry, transport and construc-
tionfortheperiodoftimeinquestion.Wecansafelyassumethatrelativepopu-
lation distribution and the previously existing economic structure remained
virtually unchanged after the economic crisis suffered in the twenties and thir-
ties, the Spanish Civil War and the first decade of severe economic autarky.
The annual breakdown of production at Altos Hornos de Vizcaya – the domi-
nant firm before and after the war – shows the same structure of production of
rolled steel products for the early s as the s. Although some degree of
bias is introduced, given that we are measuring the demand schedule more
than a decade after our period of study, we can safely assume that there was
verylittlechangeinthefundamentalaspectsoftheexistingeconomicstructure
of Spain which, in turn, is what determined the demand schedule for steel.
The algorithm was originally normalised to one unit of production and
later generalised to a production of half a million tons of steel products.
Nevertheless, the geographical solutions are insensitive to production levels.
However, introducing this scale of production was instrumental for calcu-
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Map . Spanish provinces and extra-peninsular demand allocation.
Note: See Table  for legend.
Source: Original map provided by Blanca Sánchez Alonso.lating both the total cost of transport and the total ton-kilometres trans-
ported.
The last set of parameters to be defined is transport costs. High total ter-
minal costs, both in shipping and rail transport, impose widespread dis-
crimination in rates, usually in favour of raw materials and against final
products. Discrimination is introduced to compensate the terminal costs
of lines with low traffic. The pattern of transport price discrimination
usually reflects the lower unit added value of material inputs and the greater
demand elasticity for this kind of transport. These price distortions give a
greater force of attraction to markets.
A unique transport cost was assigned to coal, ore and final products.
Therefore origin and destination of goods do not affect transport cost in any
case. As a benchmark we have used the  rail fare for one ton of coal
from Mieres, Asturias [coalfield] to Bilbao [orefield] –  pesetas – which
represents a fare per ton/km of around . pesetas. Official tariffs were
published throughout the period by the different railway companies. But
reliable rail transport prices based on the real prices being applied to large
consumers for all of the items are to date only available for southern Spain.
The company records of the major company operating in southern Spain –
Madrid-Zaragoza-Alicante – show a discrimination of prices similar to the
structure assumed below. Given the few observations we have for only one
company and the partial coverage – southern Spain – we have opted for
obtaining transport cost differentials using a different method.
We have indexed railway freight price differentials for coal, iron ore and
steel products for the United States in , in the middle of economic
depression. Rail freight rates themselves may not be considered strictly
comparable as distances, rolling stock, demand, and so on, differ consider-
ably from Spain. Nonetheless we can consider these depression-year figures
as indicative of the added value and elasticities which determined the dis-
criminated fares of each of these bulk transports. These ratios, . for ore
to coal and . for finished steel products to coal, are used to extrapolate
the ton/km fares of coal, iron ore and finished steel products which main-
tain these relative price ratios and are close to our benchmark. Coal fares
are fixed at . pesetas per ton and kilometre, iron ore at . pese-
tas and steel products at . pesetas.
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 Terminal costs include maintaining line services, railway stations, warehouses and
communications.
 Ojeda (, p. ).
 Biblioteca Fundación Ferrocarriles Españoles, Carpetas D/, D/, D/,
D/ and D/.
 Berger (, Appendix C, table C-, pp. –).
 This has been biased slightly downward to allow for some adjustment to higher
quantities being transported. But the criteria has been to normalise final product
transportation to  per cent above the average transportation cost for all goods on theDiscussion of results
Using the two alternative coals as the basis for two separate exercises, each
of the two coals has been combined alternately with each of the five iron
ores and the proposed demand schedule. At the same time the amount of
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Caminos de Hierro del Norte de España [    .;     .] and the Ferrocarril
Madrid-Zaragoza-Alicante [    .;     .] lines between  and . Rail
tariffs for this calculation were taken from Tedde de Lorca (, p. , table IV- and
p. , table IV-). The  per cent differential between average product fare and steel
product fare is taken from the US data taken from Berger (, p. ).
Table . Optimum locations using Asturian coal.
Coal Co-ordinates Transport cost Total distance Location
Asturias X Y million ptas  kms
tons
Ore Biscay  . . . . Mieres
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . Bilbao
Ore Teruel  . . . . Mieres
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . Setiles
Ore Almería  . . . . Mieres
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . Getafe-
Madrid
Ore Ponferrada  . . . . Mieres
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . Ponferrada
Ore Riff  . . . . Mieres
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . Madridcoal used in processing one ton of steel products was reduced in stages from
 tons – the upper bound we established for the late nineteenth century – to
. tons – the lower bound established by the state of the art in the s.
Both Tables  and  clearly show that Bilbao is not the optimal site in
terms of transportation cost minimisation for high to moderate coal con-
sumption, which was the level of consumption in Spanish steel mills at their
origins and probably up to the late s. The absolute minimum in terms
of transport cost minimisation is obtained in Bilbao for . tons of Asturian
coal followed very closely by Bilbao for . tons of León coal. But using
better-founded assumptions – between . and  tons of Asturian coal and
León coal – the optimal site is not Bilbao! The optimal locations are the
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Table . Optimum locations using León coal.
Coal Co-ordinates Transport cost Total distance Location
León X Y million ptas  kms
tons
Ore Biscay  . . . . La Robla
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . Bilbao
Ore Teruel  . . . . La Robla
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . Setiles
Ore Almería  . . . . La Robla
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . Aranjuez
Ore Ponferrada  . . . . La Robla
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . La Robla
Ore Riff  . . . . La Robla
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . .
 . . . .
. . . . . Madridcoalfields in Mieres and La Robla respectively. The savings for these coal
sites with respect to Bilbao oscillate between  and . pesetas per ton of
steel for León and between  and . pesetas for Asturias. Within the
framework of the model, we are talking about a lost saving of up to  per
cent on the cost price of steel rails or  per cent on steel plates. The amount
of direct welfare loss involved alone, is serious enough, without even taking
into account the secondary effects of this mislocation.
Given the magnitude of the economic welfare loss we have calculated
with our model, careful re-examination of some of the model’s assumptions
seems necessary before formulating final conclusions. The first important
assumption to be re-examined is the formalisation of transportation cost.
We have assumed transport cost to be uniform, that is, equivalent in any
direction, and that the distance paid will be the shortest distance between
two points, that is, a straight line. There is some evidence of different tariffs
for different railway companies in Spain. We have been able to calculate a
 per cent tariff differential for the average km-ton fares of the two major
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Map . Location of resources and optimal sites.rail companies operating in Spain at this time. The railway company oper-
ating in the north of Spain had slightly higher prices than the company 
operating in the south and centre of the country. This is mainly due to the
more mountainous terrain in the north. But even so, the existing differen-
tial is small enough to maintain our assumption of uniform transport cost.
Assuming that things can be moved in a straight line creates more prob-
lems. Railway tracks were far from being linear connections, due mainly to
mountain barriers. As a consequence of mountainous inland terrain, inter-
provincial transport used up to the Spanish Civil War was usually a combi-
nation of coastal shipping and rail transportation. Spain’s topography shows
that land transport is difficult because of the rise and fall of the sierras sur-
rounding the two central mesetas. Sea transport to a point of easy inland
access, combined with rail transport to the final destination was often
preferable to overland rail transport.
Given these possible objections, we have readapted the previous par-
ameters for a seaboard-rail model. All inland steel demands have been 
allocated in the following way:
() The dominant criterion has been to choose the port which pro-
vides the minimum number of railway transhipments on the
way to the final destination for each factor and final product
demand. One-haul railway routes were chosen where possible.
() If equivalent transhipment hauls existed, the port which min-
imised the distance to the final destination was chosen.
We have maintained the freight differentials between coal, ores and final
products used above, given that we assume the same added value differen-
tials and elasticities. We established the per-ton and kilometre sea freight for
coal at . pesetas, less than a third of the rail fare. Sixteen major ports
were chosen based on their importance as a final consumption point or as
transhipment points to inland demand. They were ordered along a straight
line according to the distance between them. Almost all the non-port con-
sumption points had unique optimal land routes, with the exception of
Madrid with various alternative routes. Demand from the Spanish islands
and foreign locations posed additional problems. The consumption of the
Balearic Islands was included with Valencia, that of the Canary Islands was
added to Cádiz. Madrid and foreign sales were finally assigned to Barcelona
as a strong bias against northern ports, which is where coals were located.
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 Transhipment cost can include recomposing trains, or unloading, storing and reloading.
 We have used freights for Asturian coal to Barcelona and Bilbao to regress the fixed
component of freight, between four and five pesetas, and the variable component, which
depends on distance, between . and . pesetas per km. These calculations are
for  and . As  was a year of exceptionally high English coal prices in Spain
which may have biased Spanish coal freights we chose the second benchmark. Our rail-
fare benchmark was for  so this is quite coherent.We can assume that the decision rule taken for assigning transport to its
optimal port minimises its remaining transport cost. In each case we have
chosen a combination of shipping and rail transport which reduces tran-
shipment cost. Any alternative route would be more expensive as it involved
more transhipments. Using this assumption, we can abstract the transport
cost minimisation problem to that of reducing the cost of sea transport.
Table  below shows the results.
The first result to be underlined is that Asturias – its port in Gijón – comes
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Table . Optimum locations for coastal transport.
Coal Co-ordinate Transport cost Total  Location
Asturias y million ptas distance
tons  kms
Ore Biscay  . . . Gijón
. . . .
 . . .
. . . .
 . . .
. . . . Bilbao
Ore Teruel  . . . Gijón
. . . .
 . . .
. . . .
 . . . Seville
. . . . Valencia
Ore Almería  . . . Gijón
. . . .
 . . .
. . . .
 . . . Cádiz
. . . . Almería
Ore Ponferrada  . . . Gijón
. . . .
 . . .
. . . .
 . . .
. . . . Gijón
Ore Riff  . . . Gijón
. . . .
 . . .
. . . .
 . . . La Coruña
. . . . Almería
 Supposing transhipment and rail transportation costs to be the same in all Spanish ports
is a strong assumption because the orography of Spain distorts uniformity considerably.out in a much stronger position than in the previous exercises. The coal coef-
ficient has to drop below . tons per ton of steel product to break Gijón’s
grip on minimum transport costs for any of the iron ores used. The absolute
minimum of . million pesetas – for Ponferrada ores and . tons of coal
– in Gijón tends to reaffirm the correct location of the Spanish public-owned
integrated mill, ENSIDESA, in the late fifties. State intervention in iron and
steel production in post-Civil War Spain was inspired by the necessity of pro-
viding cheap basic raw material, by the lack of coking coals and by the pres-
ence of a dominant private firm – Altos Hornos de Vizcaya – which produced
below capacity and had stopped innovating in the late s. The integrated
publicly owned mill projected in the s sought to provide solutions to
these pending problems and state technicians located it in Avilés near Gijón.
Conclusions
As in the case of overland transport, the seaboard model strengthens the
view of Bilbao as an inefficient location and strongly questions its status as
the overall optimum location. The depletion of Biscay’s ore reserves in the
s, and its falling ore grades throughout the period examined, reinforce
this conclusion. All numerical exercises for well-founded coal consumption
have been conclusive in determining coalfields as the optimum site for the
Spanish steel industry in terms of minimising domestic transport of prod-
ucts and inputs. With mislocation established beyond doubt, two other
important questions arise. On the one hand, what were the economic con-
sequences of this mislocation? And on the other hand, why and how did
Spain’s mislocated steel centre retain its position over time?
The immediate consequences of this mislocation are its serious negative
impacts on industrial development and the significant welfare loss it pro-
duced. The location of the steel industry on or near coalfields would have
reinforced the centripetal location forces of establishing Spain’s industrial
centre where cheap energy supply was – this is the thesis proposed by Ojeda
(). The expansion of Spanish steel production and downstream trans-
formation industries right up to the s was limited and distorted by the
dominant and mislocated Basque firm. On the one hand, a major input cost
for industry was inflated – the cost of steel – and on the other hand, trans-
formation industry was attracted by the steel centre in the Basque country
rather than by coalfields in Asturias which distorted their energy costs via
transport considerably.
As downstream industries such as metal transformation, shipbuilding,
household appliances, the automotive and aeroplane construction indus-
tries developed, the higher price of steel and the extra cost of transporting
coal became all the more relevant. For the model we have used, the trans-
port savings alone which could have been attained by locating steel produc-
tion in Gijón, were around five million pesetas a year or . per cent of sea
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ucts, this means up to  per cent of finished steel products’ cost price. The
magnitude of the ultimate consequences of mislocation remain hard to
establish, but the distortion effect on heavy industry’s development was very
considerable.
This raises the second question. With the production inefficiency and
welfare effects involved, why and how did Spain’s mislocated steel centre
retain its position over time? Adopting the role of the devil’s advocate, a few
arguments can be raised in Bilbao’s defence. Some of them are technical,
such as the overall reduction of coal consumption in industry, while others
are more structural – the lack of scrap iron in Spain’s backward economy,
excellent port installations, qualified labour markets, and easy access to
investment capital. And definitively, the most determinant and supporting
elements of mislocation were of an institutional nature. The speed at which
Spain’s iron and steel industry had cartelised in the early twentieth century,
and the ease with which it had attained state protection, are a clear reflec-
tion of these political and social ties between Basque mining and steel entre-
preneurs and Spain’s political oligarchy.
Starting with the weaker arguments, the lack of iron scrap for open hearth
ovens retained Bessemer technology as a predominant steel processing
method in Spain. The Bessemer converter used virtually no coal for pro-
cessing and this reinforced the orefield location of the industry in Bilbao.
Nevertheless, the advance of waste gas recovery and its application for heat-
ing Siemens open hearths invalidate this technical restriction.
Turning to the structural arguments, the potential for commercial expan-
sion in Bilbao was backed by a modern harbour. The Bilbao port had not
only modernised its installations to admit higher tonnages, but its lighting
and signalling services allowed boats to navigate day and night and had pro-
vided an extensive waterfront with docking and loading facilities. The sig-
nificance of the positive economies which derive from the iron-ore exporting
sector in the area, gave Bilbao clear advantages over Gijón. For Bilbao, the
average annual port movement was . million tons a year. Between 
and  port movement averaged , tons per year for Gijón.
Gijón’s limited harbour facilities have always been considered one of the
serious impediments to expanded coal production in Asturias at the turn of
the century. Gijón’s harbour installations were limited to ships with a
gross tonnage of around  tons, one fifth of average British tonnage
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 Churraca (, Table ). These figures have been contrasted with data obtained from
the Spanish Foreign Commerce data presented by Puerta Rueda (, Table , 
p. ), for these decades and similar results for those reference points are obtained.
 Frax Rosales (, pp.  and ). Standard deviations are , and ,
respectively, due mainly to a significant increase in coastal shipping volume during
World War I.
 Ojeda (, p. ).towards the end of the nineteenth century. The water line dropped below
navigation limits at low tide twice a day. Gijón failed to modernise its har-
bour throughout our period of analysis. But surely a correct location of the
heart of Spain’s steel and transformation industry would have provided the
incentives to modernise its port installations earlier.
An additional defence mechanism could be the scope economy found in
the availability of capital and potential investors in the Bilbao area.
González Portilla () tried to quantify profits from iron ore mining and
the importance of these funds for reinvestment in the iron and steel
industry. Although Valdaliso () has questioned the total amount rein-
vested by mine owners and mining companies in major iron and steel pro-
cessing enterprises, his figure is still considerable –  per cent of iron and
steel capital came from mining profits. Furthermore, the infrastructures and
economic activity created by Bilbao’s mining boom attracted investors.
Increasingly large capital injections from outside the steel industry were
needed to overcome the liquidity constraints faced in an industry charac-
terised by production scale economies. Over two billion pesetas were
invested in incorporated companies in Bilbao between  and . That
is  times as much as the dominant Basque steel mill, Altos Hornos de
Vizcaya, invested over the same period. Even so, there were no impedi-
ments to investing these sums of money elsewhere. Indeed, large sums of
Basque companies’ capital originated from Madrid, Catalonia and
Andalusia, and we find that Spanish – even Basque – capitalists had no prej-
udice against investing in other parts of Spain. A deficiency of capital in
the coal provinces could also have been made good by foreign investment.
It was the institutional framework which prevented this from happening.
The existing industrial concentration and cartelisation, combined with its
DUP activities and rising protectionism, explain why foreign capital increas-
ingly avoided Spain. Additionally, growing economic nationalism from the
s onwards limited the direct participation of foreign investors in
Spanish industry. Yet, it is safe to affirm that foreign capital would have
beaten a path to an optimal location, had that opportunity existed in a 
liberal competitive economic framework.
Iron-ore mining activity had other positive externalities in Bilbao. Over 
percentofBiscayanironoreintheperiodconsideredwasexportedandforeign
demand created the transportation infrastructure for bringing these minerals
intotheport.Acquisitioncostsoforeswereloweredconsiderablyforriverside
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 Churraca (, pp. –) and Houpt (, vol. II, p. ).
 There is an important investment diversification of the leading Basque family fortunes
into other provinces: Echevarrieta, Chávarri, Salazar, Rivas, Ibarra, and so on.
 Fraile (, ch. ) and González Portilla (, pp. –).
 The port of Bilbao had been improved to allow for a more fluent export of iron ore for
which there was a high demand in Great Britain, but at the same time this provided
import facilities and the possibility of applying backhaul rates for returning ships.mill locations. Massive iron ore extraction also attracted workers from sur-
rounding provinces to the nearby mining district; the estimated workforce for
theareasurroundingtheriverportgrewfrom,to,workersbetween
 and –a per cent increase. In  around , workers were
employed in Bilbao’s steel mills. By  that number had increased to ,
andbyto,fortheAltosHornosdeVizcayafactoriesalone.Butthese
same labour and transport externalities could have been present in the coal
mining districts, had they developed a thriving steel industry there earlier.
The only really distinctive element that permitted its dominant firm –
Altos Hornos de Vizcaya – to persist as an oligopolistic leading firm over
time, was the accumulated collusive behaviour of the Biscayan merchant
capitalist and capitalist bourgeoisie. The rent-seeking and captive market
strategy that Biscayan capitalists adopted is what established the firm’s
hegemony. Collusive behaviour in the iron industry can be traced back as far
as  when the four major ore merchants merged into a single firm to con-
trol Biscayan iron inputs for foundries. This joint venture monopolised ore
trade and avoided competition between its partners until the first modern
blast furnace was erected in . Similarly, from the very first moments
of mass production – the pig iron sales cartel dates back to  – the
modern steel firms in Biscay imposed cartels for different products. By
, Altos Hornos de Vizcaya had organised and completely dominated a
national sales cartel for virtually all iron and steel products. Discipline within
the cartel was imposed by a three pronged fork, the overcapacity of the
dominant firm, its technological superiority in terms of unit costs, and the
splendid profits it distributed among the members of the cartel. At the same
time its political influences combined with the general protectionist move-
ment in other sectors – agriculture and textiles – to keep foreign competition
away from home markets. Pressure groups in Biscay, Catalonia and Castile
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 The five major ore railways had their loading bays in the direct neighbourhood of the
Altos Hornos de Vizcaya factories.
 Shaw (, p. ). Iron ore production rose from ,m tons in  to ,,m
tons in  and to ,,m in . Population in the mining areas grew from
, persons in  to , in  and , in . González Portilla (,
pp. ,  and ).
 Shaw (, p. ).
 Monografía de la Sociedad Altos Hornos de Vizcaya de Bilbao (). Barcelona: Thomas,
p. ; and Monografía de las industrias siderúrgicas propiedad de la Sociedad Altos Hornos de
Vizcaya (), p. .
 Díaz Morlán (, pp. –).
 The first cartel for iron products dates back to December . Saéz García (, 
pp. –).
 The chairman of the board of Altos Hornos de Vizcaya, Pablo de Alzola, was appointed
chairman of the tariff ad hoc committee for the  tariff reform, its vice-chairman,
Faustino Rodríguez San Pedro, was a member of the Cabinet and six of its board
members were members of parliament.united in a common effort to raise barriers against foreign products. High
tariffs reinforced their capacity to capture home markets. And so, Altos
Hornos de Vizcaya’s consolidated its institutionalised grip on the sector. Its
position as a dominant firm could not be broken, even when the all-power-
ful industrial Spanish state holding INI set up a gigantic steel complex on
Spain’s coalfields in the late s in an attempt to correct mislocation.
The analysis of Spain’s steel industry contains all the elements of
Gerschenkron’s economic backwardness theory. But basic heavy industry,
unbalanced growth and state intervention combined in a way he had not
predicted. The foreign demand for Bessemer-apt iron ores and the collusion
of the Biscayan steel industry – previous to Spain’s industrial revolution –
established a mislocation which the institutional framework consolidated
and maintained until industrial reconversion and entry to the European
Union in the s. And Spain’s captured markets were able to resist direct
and indirect state intervention throughout all of this period.
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